Introduction

The 1787 Constitution created a government of limited, enumerated powers while reserving all other authority to the states and the people. Over two centuries later, the precise boundaries of that division remain fiercely contested. Two interpretive frameworks—originalism and federalism—have become central to modern constitutional jurisprudence. Originalism offers a method for understanding the Constitution’s text based on its public meaning at ratification. Federalism supplies a structural principle that limits the reach of national power. When courts apply originalist reasoning, they often arrive at conclusions that reinforce federalist limits. This article explores how those two threads intertwine, the key cases that define their relationship, and the continuing impact on American law.

Understanding Originalism

Origins and Core Premises

Originalism emerged as a distinct theory of constitutional interpretation in the late 20th century, largely in response to the perceived activism of the Warren and Burger Courts. Its foundational claim is that the Constitution’s meaning should be fixed to the understanding that prevailed when each provision was adopted. Early proponents, such as Attorney General Edwin Meese III and Judge Robert Bork, argued that only a fixed meaning could anchor judicial review in democratic consent rather than judicial preference. Justice Antonin Scalia became the theory’s most influential advocate, insisting that the Constitution is not a living document but a binding legal text.

Original Intent vs. Original Public Meaning

Originalist thought divides into two main schools. The first, original intent, seeks to recover the subjective intentions of the Framers and ratifiers. Critics note this can be difficult when the record is sparse or ambiguous. The second, original public meaning, asks what a reasonable person at the time would have understood the text to mean. Justice Scalia championed this approach, arguing that it avoids the pitfalls of hunting for private intentions. Today, most originalist judges and scholars favor original public meaning, which appears in majority opinions in cases like District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) and New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen (2022).

Contemporary Influence on the Courts

Originalism has moved from a fringe critique to a dominant theory on the Supreme Court. Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett all describe themselves as originalists in some form. Their opinions regularly invoke the Constitution’s original meaning to constrain federal power. The influence appears across many fields: criminal procedure, free speech, separation of powers, and especially federalism. The current Court’s embrace of originalism has been a driving force behind recent decisions that limit federal authority and restore state prerogatives.

Understanding Federalism

Historical Framework

Federalism is not merely a political preference; it is a constitutional mandate. The ratification debates centered on how to preserve state sovereignty while creating a stronger national government. The Tenth Amendment made explicit that powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people. Early case law, notably McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), acknowledged broad federal powers but also affirmed state immunity from federal taxation. Throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, the Court’s federalism jurisprudence vacillated between periods of strong state autonomy and periods of expansive national authority.

Dual Federalism vs. Cooperative Federalism

The traditional model of dual federalism imagined separate spheres for state and federal action. The Supreme Court in the Slaughter-House Cases (1873) limited the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment to preserve state police powers. The New Deal marked a shift to cooperative federalism, under which the federal government and states work together to administer programs, often with federal funding and federal standards. Cases like Wickard v. Filburn (1942) expanded Commerce Clause power so far that few local activities appeared immune from national regulation. By the 1990s, the Court began to reassert structural limits, rejecting the notion that federalism was merely a political constraint.

Modern Federalism Revival

Since United States v. Lopez (1995), the Supreme Court has reinvigorated federalism by requiring a substantial connection to interstate commerce before Congress may regulate non-economic activity. In Printz v. United States (1997), the Court struck down a federal law that commandeered state executive officials, holding that the Tenth Amendment prohibits such conscription. National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (2012) limited the Commerce Clause and the Spending Clause, preserving the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate only under Congress’s taxing power. Murphy v. NCAA (2018) reaffirmed the anti-commandeering doctrine. These rulings reflect a jurisprudence that takes federalism as a judicially enforceable constitutional principle, not a political question.

The Intersection of Originalism and Federalism

Text, Structure, and Original Meaning

Originalism and federalism share a common commitment to the Constitution’s text and structure. The originalist method looks to the meaning of the text as it was understood when ratified. Federalism derives directly from that text: Article I enumerates Congress’s powers, the Tenth Amendment reserves the remainder, and the Fourteenth Amendment imposes limited prohibitions on states. An originalist analysis of the Commerce Clause, for example, asks whether “commerce among the several states” in 1787 included manufacturing, agriculture, or purely local activities. Historical evidence strongly suggests it did not. Therefore, many originalist judges conclude that Congress violates federalism when it regulates noneconomic local activity.

Key Principles That Connect the Two

Several structural doctrines emerge from the intersection. Enumeration demands that every federal law find support in a specific power. Anti-commandeering prevents Congress from forcing state legislatures or executives to implement federal programs. State sovereign immunity shields states from private suits in federal court absent a valid abrogation. Federal preemption is narrowly construed when the federal statute does not clearly occupy the field. Each of these principles has been reinforced in recent decades by a Court that applies originalist reasoning to defend state autonomy.

Landmark Cases at the Intersection

United States v. Lopez (1995)

The case involved a federal law making it a crime to possess a firearm near a school. The government argued that gun possession in school zones substantially affected interstate commerce by increasing insurance costs and reducing educational achievement. The Court, in a 5–4 decision, rejected that reasoning. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion emphasized that the Constitution enumerates limited powers and that the activity in question had no explicit economic character. The opinion relied heavily on historical understanding, noting that the Framers intended the Commerce Clause to reach only “commerce” and not all activities that might indirectly affect commerce. Lopez was the first case since the New Deal to strike down a federal statute as exceeding Commerce Clause authority, and it marked a turning point in modern federalism.

Printz v. United States (1997)

In Printz, the Court addressed the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, which required state and local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on handgun purchasers. The government argued that Congress could commandeer state executive officers as a means of implementing federal law. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion held that the federal government cannot “commandeer” state officials to administer federal programs. The reasoning was explicitly originalist: the Constitution’s structure, as understood at ratification, did not permit such conscription. The opinion also cited historical practice and the Federalist Papers. Printz remains a pillar of the anti-commandeering doctrine and a powerful example of originalism protecting federalism.

National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (2012)

The case challenged the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate requiring most Americans to purchase health insurance. The government argued that the mandate was a valid exercise of Commerce Clause power because the decision not to purchase insurance had substantial economic effects. Chief Justice Roberts’s controlling opinion rejected that argument, holding that the Commerce Clause grants power to regulate existing commerce, not to compel individuals to enter commerce in the first place. Roberts relied on historical understandings of the Clause and distinguished between regulating activity and compelling inactivity. The decision preserved the mandate only under the taxing power. The opinion reaffirmed that enumerated powers have real limits and that Congress cannot expand its authority simply because a problem is national in scope.

Murphy v. NCAA (2018)

Murphy struck down the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), which prohibited states from authorizing sports gambling. The Court held that PASPA commandeered state legislatures by forcing them to keep prohibitions in place. Justice Alito’s opinion applied the anti-commandeering framework from Printz and New York v. United States. The opinion was grounded in both text and original understanding: the Constitution gives Congress limited powers, and direct regulation of state legislative processes is not among them. The decision strengthened the structural protections for state sovereignty.

New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen (2022)

While not a federalism case in the narrow sense, Bruen illustrates how originalist methodology intersects with state regulatory authority. The Court announced that Second Amendment analysis must be “rooted in the historical understanding of the right to bear arms.” The majority explicitly rejected the means-ends scrutiny that lower courts had used, insisting instead on a textual and historical inquiry. The decision struck down New York’s restrictive concealed-carry licensing regime, holding that the state could not require “proper cause” because such laws did not exist at the founding. Bruen imposes a burdensome originalist test on state gun regulations, effectively limiting state police powers in the name of original public meaning. This shows that originalism sometimes cuts against state autonomy, but the methodology remains central to the Court’s reasoning.

Originalism, Federalism, and Contemporary Issues

Health Care Regulation

The Affordable Care Act remains a flashpoint. After NFIB v. Sebelius, states have used their reserved powers to establish insurance exchanges, regulate providers, and experiment with drug pricing. Originalist arguments against federal overreach continue to appear in litigation over Medicaid work requirements, vaccine mandates, and telehealth regulations. Lower courts applying Lopez and Sebelius have scrutinized federal assertions of power that appear to lack a connection to interstate commerce. The interplay shapes the ongoing struggle between national uniformity and state flexibility.

Environmental Law

The Clean Water Act’s reach over wetlands has been a recurring subject of originalist federalism. In Sackett v. EPA (2023), the Supreme Court narrowed the definition of “waters of the United States,” holding that the Act only covers wetlands that have a continuous surface connection to traditional navigable waters. Justice Alito’s concurrence and the majority’s textualist approach both reflected originalist principles by limiting federal jurisdiction to what the language, as understood in 1972, could fairly encompass. Environmental advocates worry that such rulings reserve significant land-use authority to states, while property-rights groups celebrate the restoration of state police powers.

Gun Rights and State Sovereignty

The Bruen decision has spawned litigation challenging nearly every state gun-control law. Lower courts now must engage in historical analysis to determine whether a restriction is “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” That inquiry often requires federal judges to examine state laws from the founding era. Some states have responded by enacting permitless carry laws, asserting their own authority under the Second Amendment. The result is a complex dynamic where originalism disciplines state conduct but states retain considerable power to define their own regulatory regimes—as long as those regimes do not conflict with original meaning. Originalism both empowers and constrains state authority depending on the context.

COVID-19 Federalism

The pandemic generated public health orders that shut down businesses, limited gatherings, and imposed mask mandates. States acted under their traditional police powers. The federal government used the CDC to impose eviction moratoriums and workplace rules. The Supreme Court struck down the CDC’s eviction moratorium on originalist grounds, holding that the agency lacked statutory authority and that such power exceeded the government’s enumerated powers. States retained primary responsibility for public health, although the Court in Tandon v. Newsom (2021) also enforced the Free Exercise Clause against state COVID restrictions that discriminated against religious worship. These cases demonstrate how originalist methodology can limit federal action while still permitting some supervision of state action when individual constitutional rights are at stake.

Criticisms and Counterarguments

Originalist interpretations of federalism are not without critics. Some scholars argue that the original public meaning of “commerce” was broader than modern originalists claim, and that the Framers intended the Commerce Clause to be a robust grant of power. Others contend that federalism itself evolved after the New Deal and that the Constitution conceived of a flexible division of authority. Still others maintain that originalism is anachronistic when applied to modern regulatory challenges such as climate change or cybersecurity. These critiques fuel an ongoing academic and judicial debate. Nevertheless, the current Court’s majority has largely adopted the view that original meaning is the best guide to federal limits, and that federalism requires courts to enforce those limits with vigor.

Conclusion

The intersection of originalism and federalism in modern jurisprudence represents a coherent and influential approach to constitutional interpretation. Originalism provides a method for reading the Constitution’s text as it was understood at ratification. Federalism gives substance to the structural limits that text imposes. Together, they yield a jurisprudence that restrains federal power, respects state sovereignty, and insists that departures from the original design must be justified by clear constitutional authority. The cases from Lopez to Bruen show that this approach is not a relic of the past but an active force shaping contemporary law. As new federal initiatives push the boundaries of enumerated power, the courts will continue to wrestle with how far original meaning can accommodate modern needs—and whether federalism remains a judicially enforceable principle or becomes a political aspiration. The answer will determine the trajectory of American governance for decades to come.

For further reading, see the Tenth Amendment on Congress.gov; Cornell Legal Information Institute on Originalism; and landmark opinions in Lopez and Printz.